The Methodological Differences Between Abrogation and Specification: An Applied Study

Abstract

This study investigates the fundamental jurisprudential differences between abrogation (naskh) and specification (takhṣīṣ) in Islamic legal theory through both theoretical analysis and practical applications. It begins by providing precise definitions and conceptual clarifications of the two terms, outlining their distinctions, and analyzing their impact. It underscores that conflating abrogation with specification can lead to erroneous legal judgments. It also, employs inductive, analytical, and comparative approaches, drawing on classical and contemporary works of legal theory from the four Sunni madhhabs. The findings demonstrate that abrogation entails the nullification of a legal ruling by a subsequent, stronger textual evidence, while specification limits the scope of a general ruling to exclude certain cases without nullifying the ruling itself. Additionally, abrogation is limited to certain types of definitive evidence, whereas specification may be inferred from various sources, including consensus, reason, or contextual indicators. It affirms that a sound understanding of differences is essential for scholars engaged in legal interpretation and contributes to enhancing the methodological rigor of Islamic jurisprudence.